Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) as the controlling protocol has attracted much attention. SIP is one of the most widely used for securing and controlling communication over the Internet. Recently, Arshad and Ikram proposed an enhanced mutual authentication scheme for SIP based on Tasi's scheme. In this paper, we focus on the security weaknesses in the Arshad and Ikram's SIP authenticated scheme with Elliptic Curve Cryptography(ECC). We found that the enhanced scheme proposed by Arshad and Ikram was insecure against internal and masquerade attacks while not providing anonymity and update password phase. We then propose an advanced scheme to remedy the flaws and maintain benefits of the original scheme at the cost of increasing the computation consumptions slightly. Through a carefully security analysis and Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic analysis of our scheme, we show that our scheme is more secure than other related schemes.
Introduction
Multimedia service is one of the most important application classes of wired or wireless networks. The session initiation protocol (SIP) is a great importance protocol and has been widely used for multimedia services. SIP [1] [2] [3] is a text based and one of the most popular client/sever protocols for multimedia services. Authentication is a necessary process when a remote user wants to get services from the corresponding sever [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Most communication environments of SIP are unsafe which naturally raises the issue of providing security protection for communication participants. Therefore, try to design a robust and efficient mutual authentication is meaningful and interesting.
Recently, numerous authentication schemes have been proposed for SIP [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . In 2005, Yang et al. [15] proposed a Diffie-Hellman key exchange authentication scheme. However, both Kong [16] and Ring [17] found that Yang et al.'s scheme was vulnerable to replay attack. Later, Durlanik and Sogukpinar [18] also pointed out that the computational cost of Yang et al.'s scheme was very high and an enhanced authentication scheme was proposed by adopting Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) which offered equivalent security with smaller key size as any other cryptosystem [19, 20] . Unfortunately, Yoon et al. [21] found that Durlanik and Sogukpinar's scheme could not withstand the stolen verifier and off-line password guessing attacks. They then presented a secure ECC based authentication scheme for SIP to eliminate the flaws of Durlanik and Sogukpinar's scheme. Tsai [22] proposed an efficient authentication scheme only using hash functions and random numbers, which largely reduced the computation cost. However, Arshad and Ikram [23] showed that Tsai's scheme failed to achieve known-key secrecy and perfect forward secrecy while it was susceptible to off-line password guessing and stolen-verifier attacks. Subsequently, they presented an ECC based authenticated key agreement scheme and declared that the proposed scheme was immune to possible attacks.
This study concentrates on Arshad and Ikram's scheme. We find that Arshad and Ikram's scheme cannot protect against internal and masquerade attacks while not providing anonymity and update password phase. To remedy these weaknesses, we propose an improved scheme and maintain benefits of the original scheme at the cost of increasing the computation consumptions slightly. By a careful security analysis and BAN logic [24] analysis of our scheme, we show that it is more secure than other related schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some notations and associated difficult problems based on the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). The review and security analysis of Arshad et al.'s scheme are shown in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively. Section 5 shows our proposed scheme. Section 6 presents a security analysis of our scheme. The performance and functionality comparison among the proposed scheme and other related schemes are shown in Section 7. Section 8 is a brief conclusion.
Preliminaries
In this section, we show some notations and hard problems related with the ECC . Some notations used in this paper are shown in Table 1 . 
A review of Arshad and Ikram's scheme
In this section, we briefly review the Arshad and Ikram's scheme. There are two phases in Arshad and Ikram's scheme: registration and authentication. and checks whether it is equal to the received value. If they are equal, U and S share the session key SK . The process of authentication phase is shown in Figure 1 
Registration

Authentication and the session key establishment
Weaknesses of Arshad and Ikram's scheme
In this section, we show that Arshad and Ikram's scheme is vulnerable to internal and masquerade attacks while not providing anonymity and password changing phase. The following attacks are based on the assumptions that a malicious attacker C has 
. , 
Anonymity
In Arshad and Ikram's scheme, U 's U ID is exposed in public channel. Thus, any malicious attacker can intercept the message among the communication channel and easily trace who communicates with S .
Internal attack
In the registration phase of Arshad 
C who is masquerading as U and S will authenticate each other and agree on the common session key.
Lack of password update option
When U 's password is expired or leaked, U may wish to change U PW ,for the sake of security. Moreover, it is a widely recommended security policy for highly secure applications that users' password should be updated or changed frequently. However, there is no such option in Arshad and Ikram's scheme.
Advanced scheme
In this section, we propose an improved mutual authentication scheme for SIP. Our proposed scheme not only overcomes weaknesses of Arshad and Ikram's scheme but also achieves mutual authentication and resists internal attack. 
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. EID Figure 2 . Authentication and the session key establishment phase of the proposed scheme
Security analysis
In this section, we first conduct discussion and a security analysis of the proposed scheme. Then, we apply Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic [24] to demonstrate that the authentication process can correctly generate a session key between communicating entities. The following attacks are based on the assumptions that a malicious attacker C has completely monitor over the communication channel connecting U and S in mutual authentication and key agreement phase. So C can eavesdrop, modify, insert, or delete any message transmitted via public channel [25] .
Anonymity
In our scheme, user's real identity is related with user's random number and the server's public key. The legal server can gain the correct data by using his private key. Any third parties are not able to know which service is request by U .
Internal attack
In the registration phase,
The sever S cannot retrieve the user's password because of the property of the hash function and secret information. Thus, C will be unable to plot internal attack successfully.
Mutual authentication
In our scheme, S authenticates U by verifying 
Verifier attack
Even though C acquires EID stored in S , he does not have sufficient information to calculate user's identity and password since they are hidden in a hash function with S 's secret key S p . Therefore, our scheme is secure against verifier attack.
Replay attack
In our scheme, even if C initiates a parallel session to imitate legitimate user to login onto the server by resending the captured messages transmitted from U to S , he cannot be authenticated successfully by S . Since U generates a new random number U R for each authentication request, the previous T is not equal to the new one. Therefore, the proposed scheme is secure against replay attack.
Perfect forward secrecy
Even though
C can compromise all the passwords of communication entities, he cannot compromise the session key at all. In our scheme,
is generated by U and S , respectively. based on the security of CDL problem. Thus, our scheme can achieve perfect forward secrecy.
Verifying authentication scheme with BAN logic
We introduce some notations and logical postulates of BAN logic that we will use in our scheme.
BAN logical postulates
a. Message-meaning rule: 
Performance and security properties comparison
In this section, we compare the functionality and performance of our scheme with Chaudhry et al's scheme [10, 11] , Kumari et al.'s scheme [12] , Tsai's scheme [22] , Arshad and Ikram's scheme [23] . All comparisons are described as Tables 3 and 4. From  Table 3 , we can see that the proposed scheme can provide proper user anonymity and password changing phase while preventing insider, masquerade, and verifier attacks, where Tsai's [22] and Arshad and Ikram's schemes [23] fail to cope with, Chaudhry et al's. scheme [10] cannot provide password change phase, both of Chaudhry et al.'s scheme [11] and Kumari et al.'s scheme [12] fail to consider verifier attack. The computation cost of these schemes is shown in Table 4 , where H , PM , PA, and S denote a hash function operation, an elliptic curve scalar point multiplication operation, an elliptic curve point addition operation, a symmetrical cryptography operation and exclusive-OR operations separately. From Table 4 , we can see that Tsai's scheme [22] has better performance than Chaudhry et al.'s scheme [11] , Kumari et al.'s scheme [12] , Arshad and Ikram's scheme [23] , and the proposed scheme, but Chaudhry et al.'s scheme [10] consumes a slightly higher than our scheme. In a word, the proposed scheme is more secure and has many excellent features compared with these related schemes.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a security analysis of the Arshad and Ikram's scheme and shown that the scheme is vulnerable to internal, masquerade attacks and can not provide anonymity and password changing phase. An advanced scheme is proposed that inherits the merits of the Arshad and Ikram's scheme and resists the aforementioned attacks with a slight higher computation cost than others. Finally, in comparison with the previously proposed schemes on security and performance, our scheme is efficient and more secure than other related schemes.
